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DIGITAL MEDICATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR USE IN THE 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 13, 2017, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved the first drug in the United States with a digital ingestion 
tracking system.1  The tracking system incorporates several 
components.  First, an aripiprazole tablet, an atypical antipsychotic2 
used to treat schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other mental 
illnesses, is embedded with an ingestible event marker sensor.3  When 
the pill is ingested and comes into “contact with digestive fluid, the 
digital tablet dissolves and activates.”4  Upon activation, the sensor 
emits a time-stamped signal, which is detected by an adhesive sensor 
patch, approximately 10 cm long, that is worn on the patient’s torso.5  
Data from the sensor patch is then transmitted and stored in a 
Bluetooth-enabled device.6  If the patient so chooses, the data can be 
uploaded to a cloud-based, encrypted, HIPAA-compliant record, which 
can be shared with the patient’s physician and caregivers.7  The 
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 1 FDA Approves Pill with Sensor That Digitally Tracks if Patients Have Ingested Their 
Medication, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release, FDA], 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-pill-sensor-
digitally-tracks-if-patients-have-ingested-their-medication.  
 2 Aripiprazole (Abilify), NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nami.org/Learn-
More/Treatment/Mental-Health-Medications/aripiprazole-(Abilify) (last visited Mar. 
3, 2021). 
 3 Preetika Rana, Digital Pills That Talk to Your Doctor Are Here, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 
2017, 11:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-approves-worlds-first-digital-
drug-1510621146. 
 4 Dr. Tina Caliendo & Dr. Olga Hilas, The Promise and Pitfalls of Digital Medication, 
U.S. PHARMACIST (July 18, 2019), https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/the-promise-
and-pitfalls-of-digital-medication. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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captured data includes not only information regarding the date and time 
of ingestion, but also “physiological metrics such as physical activity, 
heart rate, skin temperature, and sleep.”8  The patient can also choose to 
self-report data such as mood and quality of sleep.9 
The impetus behind the digital pill was to improve patient 
adherence and to allow physicians to provide more effective and 
collaborative care through increased transparency.10  Many in the health 
care community, including the Director of the Division of Psychiatry 
Products in the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
recognize the value of a system that tracks medication adherence in 
some patients with mental illness,11 a segment of the medical 
community with notoriously low rates of non-adherence.12  Other 
commentators, however, have proven to be more skeptical of this new 
technology,13 believing the digital pill portends an age of “biomedical big 
brother,”14 one in which insurance companies will leverage the 
technology to strong-arm compliance and potential data breaches 
threaten patient privacy.15  
Another line of critique focuses on the potential use of the digital 
pill in the criminal justice sphere.  Advocates for the mental health 
community fear the ethical and constitutional quandaries of monitoring 
a segment of the population “already disproportionately subjected to 
 
 8 Id.  
 9 What Is the ABILIFY MYCITE System?, ABILIFY MYCITE [hereinafter Product 
Information], https://www.abilifymycite.com/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 10 Brian Dolan, Proteus Biomedical Tweaks Branding, Partners with Abilify-Maker 
Otsuka, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2012, 3:55 AM), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/
17831/proteus-biomedical-tweaks-branding-partners-with-abilify-maker-otsuka. 
 11 Press Release, FDA, supra note 1. 
 12 Non-adherence to medication regimes is endemic to the treatment of both 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  Studies have shown that as much as 75 percent of 
schizophrenic patients will stop taking their medications within 18 months of 
treatment, and more than 90 percent will miss doses on a regular basis.  E. Brown & R. 
Gray, Tackling Medication Non-Adherence in Severe Mental Illness:  Where Are We Going 
Wrong?, 22 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 192, 192–93 (2015).  Similar rates of 
non-adherence are documented among patients with bipolar disorder.  F. Colom et al., 
Identifying and Improving Non-Adherence in Bipolar Disorders, 7 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 24, 
24 (2005). 
 13 See generally Cat Wise, This Digital Pill Wants to Make Following Your Prescription 
Easier, PBS (May 23, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/
following-a-prescription-is-hard-this-digital-pill-wants-to-help. 
 14 Pam Belluck, First Digital Pill Approved to Worries About Biomedical ‘Big Brother,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/health/digital-pill-
fda.html. 
 15 Concerns regarding use of the digital pill by insurance companies and privacy 
considerations are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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coercion and surveillance.”16  Others fear disproportionate misuse of the 
technology by judges and probation officers, who stand at the ready to 
send an offender back to prison for any deviation from his medication 
regime.17 
This Comment will take the opposite position, arguing that use of 
the digital pill in our criminal justice system for certain offenders who 
have a history of either self-injurious or violent behavior when not 
medicated, coupled with a track record of medication non-adherence, is 
both constitutional and advisable as a matter of public policy.  A special 
condition of supervised release18 that requires this small segment of 
seriously mentally ill offenders to take digital medication and to share 
the captured data with their probation officers would provide 
supervision and accountability to those who could benefit from such 
oversight and would prove valuable to the health care and prison 
systems, as well as the community at large. 
Part II will analogize the digital pill to other utilized forms of 
enhanced post-release supervision such as forceable medication via 
long-acting injectable antipsychotics and monitoring devices, such as 
electronic location monitors or the secure continuous remote alcohol 
monitor, to make the argument that the imposition of digital medication 
as a term of supervised release passes constitutional muster.   
Part III will first discuss the alarming rates of incarceration of 
seriously mentally ill offenders and the difficulties correctional 
institutions face in caring for this population.19  In light of these realities, 
Part III will then address why digital medication, for the right patient 
and in conjunction with other terms of supervised release providing 
treatment and support services, reflects good policy that would alleviate 
some of the strain placed on both our criminal justice and mental health 
systems, in addition to being beneficial to the patient himself.  Part III 
 
 16 David M. Perry, Your Pills Are Spying on You, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://psmag.com/social-justice/the-pills-have-eyes. 
 17 Wise, supra note 13. 
 18 Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supervised release took the place 
of parole for federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987.  See P.L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1987; see also Charles Doyle, Supervised Release (Parole): An Overview of Federal 
Law, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/
RL31653.  While there are marked differences between the two, both supervised release 
and parole represent terms of restricted freedom following a period of incarceration.  Id.  
Additionally, revocation of either parole or supervised release could potentially mean a 
return to prison.  Id.  Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, it is a non-substantive 
distinction, and any references to parole in the articles or case law cited herein should 
be considered to apply equally to the system of supervised release.   
 19 Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C. 
R.-C. L. L. REV. 391, 391 (2006). 
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will, hopefully, help assuage some of the worst fears of mental health 
advocates by arguing that both constitutional constraints and the 
limitations of the technology itself will help ensure that the use of digital 
medication is both constrained and flexible.   
It must be stressed that while this Comment argues that enhanced 
supervision through digital medication for a small segment of mentally 
ill offenders is one way to potentially improve recidivism rates for 
mentally ill offenders, thereby helping to improve overall conditions in 
penal institutions, this Comment does not suggest that this potential tool 
should be used in isolation.  There are many other methods by which to 
improve prison conditions, such as decreasing overall rates of 
incarceration, increasing the number of mental hospital beds, and 
financing more robust community outreach programs for persons 
suffering from mental illness both prior to, and upon release from, 
incarceration.  By no means should digital medication be seen as a 
substitute for these much-needed reforms to our criminal justice and 
mental health care systems, but rather, as one tool to increase 
transparency for a select number of offenders who would benefit from 
closer supervision. 
Finally, Part IV will briefly discuss two other areas where the 
criminal justice system could potentially leverage this technology.  First, 
this Comment will discuss the potential use of digital medication as a 
discretionary condition of probation and explore how the legal and 
policy implications of such a condition are both analogous to, and 
divergent from, a condition of supervised release.  Second, this 
Comment will touch upon the potential for such technology to expand 
into the treatment of opioid addiction. 
II.  LEGAL STANDARD FOR CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE20 
Digital medication is unique in that it encompasses both a 
medication and monitoring component.21  Because of the novelty of 
digital medication, this Comment will break down its components, first 
discussing the legal standard surrounding special conditions of 
supervised release that compel an offender to take certain medications, 
and then addressing the standard around monitoring devices.  First, 
however, this Comment will discuss 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the federal statute 
that addresses terms of supervised release after imprisonment. 
 
 20 This Comment will look solely at the federal statutory and constitutional 
standards governing special conditions of supervised release.  
 21 See supra Part I. 
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When sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment for either 
a felony or misdemeanor, a district court may require that the defendant 
be “placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.”22  When 
the sentence of imprisonment exceeds one year, or if the statute so 
provides, a term of supervised release is compulsory.23  Moreover, 
certain conditions, such as drug testing and registration of convicted sex 
offenders, must be imposed with every term of supervised release.24  In 
addition to these mandatory conditions, district courts have discretion 
to impose any appropriate condition of supervised release provided 
that the condition is reasonably related to the following factors: (1) the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant;25 (2) the desire to adequately deter 
criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from future crime; 
and (4) the aim of providing the defendant with “education or vocation 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.”26  Additionally, the condition must involve no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the 
aforementioned purposes.27  Finally, the condition must be “consistent 
with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).”28   
District courts are afforded wide latitude in crafting conditions of 
supervised release, which are only reviewed for abuse of discretion 
upon appeal.29  Special conditions mandating that offenders comply 
with various treatment programs are not anomalous.30  Rather, the 
Sentencing Guidelines specifically identify “Mental Health Program 
Participation” as a special condition of supervised release that may be 
appropriate if there is evidence that the defendant is in need of 
 
 22 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). 
 23 18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.1. 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
 25 Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
 26 Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
 27 Id. § 3583(d)(2). 
 28 Id. § 3583(d)(3). 
 29 United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States 
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234 
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that district courts have “broad discretion” when imposing 
terms of supervised release, even when it comes to “restrictions that infringe on 
fundamental rights”). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Conelly, 451 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming 
special condition mandating that defendant “attend, complete, and pay for mental health 
services as directed by the probation officer”); United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141, 
1143–46 (10th Cir. 2003) (mandating that the offender participate in an approved 
mental health program); Dotson, 324 F.3d at 261 (requiring offender submit to penile 
plethysmograph testing). 
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psychiatric treatment.31  While the Sentencing Guidelines are silent as to 
whether “Mental Health Program Participation” may include a mandate 
that the offender take all prescribed medications, numerous courts have 
seen this as a logical extension of the rationale underlying this special 
condition and have approved these types of mandates.32  Special 
conditions that require an offender to submit to electronic monitoring 
are commonplace33 and are listed in the Sentencing Guidelines as special 
conditions that may be imposed in appropriate cases.34   
While 18 U.S.C. § 3583 plays into the analysis of whether digital 
medication may be imposed as a special condition of supervised release, 
this Comment will primarily focus on potential constitutional 
challenges.  There are three reasons for this.  First, the vast majority of 
our nation’s incarcerated people are held in state prisons and jails.35  
Therefore, by concentrating on the constitutional standards, this 
Comment will identify the overarching limits of this technology, which 
apply to all federal and state correctional institutions, without wading 
through myriad state statutory schemes that will add a layer of analysis.  
Second, from a practical perspective, many of the same factors are 
pertinent to both a statutory and constitutional review.  And third, as 
will be seen in the discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Holman, if a term of supervised release passes the more 
demanding constitutional inquiry, it will often pass statutory scrutiny as 
well.  For these reasons, as will be argued infra, the statutory analysis is 
largely subsumed by the constitutional one, at least in the federal 
context. 
 
 31 18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.3(d)(5). 
 32 See, e.g., United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Larson, No. 09-1465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23704, at *6 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010).  See 
generally United States v. Caluori, No. 16-354, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218650 (M.D.N.C 
Mar. 24, 2017), aff’d, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4103 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 33 See, e.g., Pollard v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. 16-2918-pr, 2017 U.S App. 
LEXIS 9004, at *11–13 (2d Cir. May 24, 2017) (affirming special conditions subjecting 
offender to both GPS and computer monitoring); United States v. Miller, No. 12-50238, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11837, at *337–38 (5th Cir. June 12, 2013) (holding that special 
condition subjecting defendant to active Global Positioning System (GPS) Monitoring 
was appropriate given the defendant’s propensity for “angry outbursts” and “erratic 
behavior” that potentially posed a threat to the public). 
 34 18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) (special condition for sex offenses requiring 
defendant to participate in program for monitoring of sex offenders); 18 U.S.C. app. 
§ 5D1.3(e)(5) (allowing for use of electronic monitoring to confirm defendant’s 
compliance with curfew). 
 35 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie
2019.html. 
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A.  Potential Constitutional Challenges to Involuntary Medication 
The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners and pretrial 
detainees possess a “significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process 
Clause.”36  The origins of this liberty interest can be traced back to a 
long-standing common law rule of torts that any unauthorized touching 
by a physician constitute a battery.37   
The state is required to show an “essential or overriding 
[governmental] interest” before depriving an individual of such a 
fundamental liberty interest.38  In Washington v. Harper, the Court found 
that the state’s interest in administering medication was “legitimate” 
and “important.”39  And it went on to hold that the Due Process Clause 
permits the state to treat a seriously mentally ill inmate with medication 
against his will if the inmate is “dangerous to himself or others and the 
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”40  Thus, the inmate’s valid 
liberty interest yields to the state’s interest in providing appropriate 
medical care upon a showing of an “overriding justification and a 
determination of medical appropriateness.”41  The test the court applies 
in determining whether such overriding justification and medical 
appropriateness exist is dependent on the state’s interest.42  If the 
involuntary medication order is sought out of concern that the prisoner 
poses a danger to himself or others, the test is whether the medication 
is “medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, 
essential for the sake of [the prisoner’s] own safety or the safety of 
others.”43  If the government is seeking such an order to restore a 
mentally ill defendant’s competency for trial, the court must apply the 
slightly more onerous test delineated in Sell v. United States.44 
The Court in Sell held that for the state to forcibly medicate a 
mentally ill pretrial detainee for purposes of restoring competency for 
trial, the court must conclude (1) that there are important government 
interests at stake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly 
further those state interests, (3) that involuntary medication is 
 
 36 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990). 
 37 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294, n.4 (1982). 
 38 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (quoting Washington, 494 U.S. 
at 225, 277). 
 39 Id. at 178. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 42 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288–90 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 43 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
 44 Holman, 532 F.3d at 289. 
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necessary to further those interests, and (4) that administration of the 
drugs is medically appropriate.45 
The two lines of inquiry consider many of the same factors.  The 
Court, however, has noted that the analysis performed when there is an 
allegation of danger is both more “objective” and “manageable.”46  This 
is because the reviewing court does not have to analyze the added layer 
of “quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence” nor 
weigh such considerations against the competing state interest.47 
It is unclear which test is applicable when reviewing special 
conditions of supervised release.  The Court in Washington noted that 
the state’s interest in ensuring that the offender was not a danger to 
himself or others was even more significant in a prison setting because 
prison officials are responsible for running an orderly institution and 
ensuring the safety of prisoners and staff.48  Thus, an important factual 
consideration that the Court afforded considerable weight does not exist 
when analyzing conditions of supervised release.  Even more disparate 
is the Sell scenario, which must also account for possible side effects of 
the medication that could interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel in his defense.49   
In United States v. Holman, the Fourth Circuit was confronted with 
the question of which test to apply when examining a special condition 
of supervised release requiring that a mentally ill defendant submit to 
intramuscular injections of an antipsychotic.50  While acknowledging 
that the “showing necessary to satisfy” the requirements of overriding 
justification and medical appropriateness is dependent on the “context 
and reasons underlying the order,”51 the Fourth Circuit ultimately 
created a hybrid of the two lines of inquiry, referring to it as the “Harper-
Riggins-Sell constitutional analysis.”52  While referring to it as an 
amalgamation, the court used the express language from the Sell test, 
suggesting that, at least in the Fourth Circuit, the four-part Sell test is the 
preferred mode of inquiry when analyzing the constitutionality of 
special conditions of supervised release that implicate a fundamental 
 
 45 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81. 
 46 Id. at 183. 
 47 Id. at 182. 
 48 Washington, 494 U.S. at 225 (noting the state’s legitimate and important interest 
in “combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others . . . in a prison 
environment”). 
 49 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
 50 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 51 Id. at 289. 
 52 Id. at 290. 
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liberty interest.53  But other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, eschew the 
rigidity of the Sell test, instead focusing the constitutional inquiry on 
whether there has been a “finding of overriding justification and a 
determination of medical appropriateness.”54  
The question remains whether this constitutional analysis 
“supplants or supplements the statutory requirements set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(d).”55  When confronted with a constitutional challenge to 
a special condition of supervised release, some circuits have declined to 
perform a separate constitutional inquiry, holding that “a court will not 
strike down conditions of release, even if they implicate fundamental 
rights, if such conditions are reasonably related to the ends of 
rehabilitation and protection of the public from recidivism.”56  In both 
United States v. Schave and United States v. Ritter, the defendant 
challenged a special condition of supervised release as violative of his 
First Amendment freedom of association.57  While both the Schave and 
Ritter courts maintained that the central inquiry was whether the 
condition furthered the ends delineated in the statute and proceeded to 
analyze the condition using the statutory framework and terminology, 
both courts ultimately addressed the constitutional challenges brought 
by the defendant.58  This suggests that, at least in the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits, the constitutional inquiry supplements an analysis under 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
 
 53 Id. at 290–91 (finding that (1) the government’s interest in protecting Holman 
from himself and the general public are “essential or overriding interests,” (2) the 
special condition “significantly furthers and is clearly necessary” to further this interest, 
and (3) that the special condition is medically appropriate, given Holman’s lengthy 
history of medication non-adherence); see also United States v. Caluori, No. 16-354, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218650 (M.D.N.C Mar. 24, 2017), at *32–35 (M.D.N.C. 2017) 
(imposing a condition of supervised release requiring Caluori take antipsychotic 
medication after finding (1) the defendant posed a substantial risk to the public, (2) 
antipsychotics were necessary to control Caluori’s symptoms, and (3) such a 
requirement is medically appropriate).  
 54 United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)). 
 55 Holman, 532 F.3d at 290. 
 56 United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States 
v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that “even though supervised release 
restrictions may affect constitutional rights such as First Amendment protections, most 
restrictions are valid if directly related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and 
to protecting the public from recidivism” before reviewing the challenged special 
condition using the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) factors). 
 57 Schave, 186 F.3d at 840–41; Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504. 
 58 Schave, 186 F.3d at 843 (adopting a narrow construction of special condition to 
avoid any “potential constitutional difficulties”); Ritter, 118 F.3d at 506 (finding that 
condition “intrudes minimally” upon defendant’s constitutional rights). 
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Conversely, in United States v. Myers, the Second Circuit held that 
when a special condition implicates “a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by due process,” the court’s “application of the § 3583(d) 
factors must reflect the heightened constitutional concerns.”59  
Accordingly, the condition will only be upheld “if the deprivation [of 
liberty] is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.”60  Thus, the Second Circuit sets a much higher bar than the 
“reasonably related” standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, suggesting 
that the statute should be interpreted to permit whatever passes 
constitutional scrutiny.  It should be noted that in Myers, the court was 
considering a substantive due process challenge, rather than one 
brought under the First Amendment.  Therefore, it would seem that 
Myers’ holding that the constitutional analysis supplants the statutory 
requirements would apply to any substantive due process challenge 
brought to a condition mandating digital medication.  Yet, in Holman, the 
Fourth Circuit suggested that this circuit split concerning the interplay 
between a constitutional and statutory analysis has little bearing when 
it comes to special conditions mandating antipsychotic medication.61  As 
the following Section demonstrates, that may, in part, be attributable to 
the fact that courts ask many of the same key questions and analyze the 
same factors when determining whether the condition passes both 
statutory and constitutional muster.62 
  
 
 59 United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 125–26 (2d. Cir. 2005) (considering 
constitutional challenge to a condition of supervised release that interfered with 
defendant’s relationship with his constitutionally protected interest in his relationship 
with his child). 
 60 Id. 
 61 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2008) (the court held the 
special condition at issue was properly imposed when analyzed under the Harper-
Riggins-Sell framework and, thus, declined to weigh in on the question of whether the 
constitutional analysis supplants or supplements the statutory requirements). 
 62 It should be noted that such a term of supervised release may also be subject to a 
procedural due process challenge if the offender is not afforded notice and a hearing and 
if the sentencing judge does not properly articulate on the record that the condition 
“involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”  United States 
v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055–57 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the “unusually serious 
infringement of liberty” attendant to special conditions requiring compliancy with 
antipsychotic medications requires a higher standard of “consideration and 
justification” on the record than is normally required of sentencing judges when 
imposing conditions of supervised release); see also Allred v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-
245, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112542, at *25–26 (D.C. Utah Dec. 3, 2009) (citing Holman, 
532 F.3d at 290 and United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2008) for the 
proposition that a hearing is required before imposing a term of supervised release 
requiring medication compliancy). 
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B.  The Medication Component of the Digital Pill Passes 
Constitutional Muster  
Under the Harper-Riggins-Sell framework,63 propounded in 
Holman, a district court considering a special condition mandating 
digital medication must first determine whether there is an “essential or 
overriding” government interest at stake.64  This requirement closely 
mirrors 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which requires that the condition be related 
to the following government interests: (1) the desire to adequately deter 
criminal conduct; and (2) the need to protect the public from future 
crime.65  There is no question that protecting a mentally ill offender from 
himself and protecting the general public from future crime are 
essential government interests.66  Therefore, once a court decides that 
medication is essential for the safety of the mentally ill offender or 
others this prong of the test is satisfied.67 
The court must then examine whether involuntary medication 
significantly furthers and is clearly necessary to those interests.68  This 
involves a highly fact-specific inquiry into the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.69  It is not sufficient to speak in 
generalities as to the importance of psychotropic drugs in the treatment 
of schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, rather the court must inquire as to 
the specific characteristics of the defendant before it.70  The court must 
also consider whether there are “any alternative, less intrusive 
treatments” that are likely to achieve substantially the same results.71   
  
 
 63 While not the universally accepted standard, it is the most onerous and, therefore, 
serves as the high-water mark for a constitutional analysis. 
 64 Holman, 532 F.3d at 290. 
 65 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (requiring courts to conform conditions with factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C)). 
 66 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992); see also Holman, 532 F.3d 
at 290. 
 67 See Holman, 532 F. 3d at 290 (finding that “[t]he government’s interest in 
protecting Holman from himself and protecting the general public from Holman are 
essential or overriding interests sufficient to support an order requiring the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs”). 
 68 Id. at 289. 
 69 For the factors that must be considered under statutory analysis, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1) (the history and characteristics of the defendant), and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) (the aim of providing the defendant with “education or vocation 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”); 
see also Sell factors, which require inquiry into the medical history of the offender.  Sell 
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 184 (2003). 
 70 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 71 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
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Two potentially less intrusive means must be considered.  First, a 
district court could simply require an offender to take all prescribed 
medications.  Upon regular check-ins, a probation officer, in partnership 
with a mental health professional, could assess the offender’s mood and 
cognitive functions to determine if the offender appears compliant.  
Perhaps the offender could also be required to produce receipts or other 
documentation proving that he obtained his medications.  If the 
probation officer and mental health professional have reason to believe 
the offender is not compliant, they could then order him to submit to a 
urine analysis.72 
While this alternative is unquestionably less intrusive, it is unlikely 
to achieve substantially similar results as a requirement that an 
offender take digital medication.  Even if a urine analysis could deliver 
proof positive regarding compliance, there is the concern that after 
abruptly discontinuing medication an offender’s thoughts would 
become too disordered to continue complying with other stated terms 
of his supervised release, specifically attending check-in meetings with 
his probation officer.73  Critically, for an involuntary medication order 
to be necessary to further an important government interest it must be 
predicated upon a finding that the offender has a history of refusing 
medication.74  Thus, there are sufficient grounds to argue that this less 
intrusive condition is “unlikely to achieve substantially the same 
results.”75 
The second potentially less intrusive alternative is that a district 
court could impose a condition, similar to the one that was brought 
before the Holman court, requiring the use of intramuscular injections 
of an antipsychotic.76  Studies suggest that long-acting injectable 
antipsychotics (LAIAs) have a number of advantages over their oral 
counterparts.77  They were primarily developed to improve rates of 
medication adherence and to “reduce the high rates of relapses and 
rehospitalizations in schizophrenia due to treatment discontinuation.”78   
 
 72 See generally Joseph McEvoy et al., Quantitative Levels of Aripiprazole Parent Drug 
and Metabolites in Urine, 231 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 23 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4221623/#!po=2.38095. 
 73 Miriam Larsen-Barr et al., Attempting to Discontinue Antipsychotic Medication: 
Withdrawal Methods, Relapse and Success, 270 PSYCHIATRY RES. 365, 371 (2018) 
(reporting that negative effects of medication withdrawal include “confusion, 
disassociation, disorientation” and “difficulty with functioning”). 
 74 See United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 75 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
 76 Holman, 532 F.3d at 286. 
 77 Eduard Parellada & Miquel Bioque, Barriers to the Use of Long-Acting Injectable 
Antipsychotics in the Management of Schizophrenia, 30 CNS DRUGS 689, 690 (2016). 
 78 Id. 
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Despite these significant advantages, there are also drawbacks to 
LAIAs.  Because they are long-acting, it takes a greater period of time to 
achieve steady levels in patients.79  Additionally, it is more difficult for a 
physician to adjust the dosage level if she feels her patient is not 
responding well to the medication.80  Finally, there are a number of 
reasons why a patient might be averse to taking an LAIA, including pain 
at the injection site, the burden of traveling to a clinic for administration 
of the injections, and the perception of stigma.81 
It is important to bear in mind that in Holman, Holman’s prison 
psychiatrist recommended the use of LAIAs.82  Additionally, while in 
prison, Holman received injections of risperidone, the same 
antipsychotic specified in the condition of supervised release,83 
indicating that his psychiatrist knew that he tolerated the medication 
well.  Ultimately, much of the decision around whether an LAIA is an 
appropriate, less intrusive treatment will bear on the recommendation 
of the treating physician. 
Courts must also consider the patient’s preference with regard to 
medication.  Some patients prefer a monthly injection to remembering 
to take a pill daily.84  This concern with missing pills is sure to be 
compounded by the fact that missed dosages could result in a return to 
prison.85  Moreover, some patients feel burdened psychologically by 
their daily medication regimen, seeing it as a constant reminder of their 
illness.86 
Injections and digital medications are both intrusive in their own 
ways.  In considering which form of “intrusion” outweighs the other, it 
is important to bear in mind that a term of supervised release does not 
last indefinitely.87  Therefore, it is important to use this period of 
supervision to develop good habits and to encourage a system that the 
offender can continue on his own once the period of supervision has 
ended.  If the offender will have difficulty traveling to a clinic monthly to 
 
 79 Sofia Brissos et al., The Role of Long-Acting Injectable Antipsychotics in 
Schizophrenia: A Critical Appraisal, 4 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 198, 
201 (2014). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 693. 
 85 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“[T]he court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, 
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release 
. . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated 
a condition of supervised release. . . .”) 
 86 Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 694. 
 87 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (authorized terms of supervised release). 
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receive his injection or believes monthly injections are particularly 
stigmatizing, then it makes little sense to compel him to adhere to a 
treatment regime he will likely abandon once the term of supervised 
release ends.  The “least intrusive” condition, therefore, will consider 
both the treating physician’s recommendation and the patient’s 
preference. 
Finally, the court must determine medical appropriateness by 
looking at whether the condition is in the patient’s best medical 
interest.88  Because symptoms of schizophrenia can include paranoia 
and delusions, some mental health professionals fear that forcing 
patients to use a system that will “monitor their behavior and send 
signals out of their body” could exacerbate their conditions and be 
detrimental to their prognoses.89  Thus, before any such condition could 
be imposed on an offender, his psychiatrist must determine that he is an 
appropriate candidate for digital medication.  Additionally, probation 
officers should make every effort to have a conversation with the 
offender and his mental health professional to explain the capabilities of 
the technology and the limited data that it can store and transmit.90  
Knowing the system is not transmitting any sensitive medical data 
should hopefully assuage some of the patient’s concerns.91 
C.  The Monitoring Component of the Digital Pill Also Passes 
Constitutional Muster 
As stated above, the digital pill is more than just an antipsychotic 
medication, it also contains a monitoring component.92  Technologies 
related to electronically monitoring individuals typically fall into two 
categories—electronic location monitors and chemical substance 
monitors.93  Courts routinely impose both types of electronic monitors 




 88 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4. 
 91 While information regarding the patient’s activity levels, heart rate, and body 
temperature is automatically collected by the system, the patient can decline to share 
this information with third parties.  Terms & Conditions of Use and Patient Privacy Notice, 
ABILIFY MYCITE 11, 14 (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.otsuka-us.com/media/static/Abilify-
Mycite-Patient-Terms-of-Use-and-Privacy-Notice.pdf. 
 92 Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4. 
 93 Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1332 (2008). 
 94 Id. 
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Electronic location monitors typically work by either setting 
parameters for where an individual can or cannot go or by giving precise 
information about an offender’s location that can either be reviewed 
later or in real time.95  All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the 
federal government use electronic location monitors to track the 
movements and activities of either pretrial defendants or offenders on 
probation or supervised release.96  Many of the state provisions are 
based on broad categories, such as the nature of the offense, rather than 
on an “individualized determination of the dangerousness or likely 
recidivism” of a particular offender.97 
One of the most prevalently used chemical substance monitors is 
SCRAM, the secure continuous remote alcohol monitor.98  Often imposed 
as a condition for incorrigible drunk drivers, the monitor attaches to the 
offender’s ankle and tests the alcohol concentration levels in the 
person’s sweat on an hourly basis.99  It then date and time stamps the 
data before storing it for transmission, typically to the offender’s 
probation officer, via the offender’s home phone.100   
Given the purpose and functionality of the SCRAM device—to 
monitor the ingestion of certain substances and to transmit relevant 
data regarding same to the offender’s probation officer via the 
offender’s phone—it would appear that digital medication can be most 
closely analogized to this type of monitoring device.  This would suggest 
that the monitoring component of the digital pill is on solid 
constitutional footing.  In Diehl v. Parole Bd.,101 for instance, Magistrate 
Judge Joseph G. Scoville of the Western District of Michigan found the 
SCRAM device to be “just another method to monitor a parolee’s alcohol 
use, no different in kind from random urine testing.”102  Reasoning that 
parolees have no Fourth Amendment right to be free from random drug 
testing103—indeed, in the federal context, it is a required term of 
 
 95 Id. at 1332–33.  
 96 Stephanie Fahy et al., Use of Electronic Offender-Tracking Devices Expands Sharply, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-of-electronic-offender-tracking-devices-expands-
sharply. 
 97 Murphy, supra note 93, at 1333. 
 98 Id. at 1334. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 No. 1:12-cv-402, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91059 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2012), adopted, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90182 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012). 
 102 Id. at *7. 
 103 Id. at *7–8 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989)). 
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supervised release104—Magistrate Judge Scoville found that the 
imposition of SCRAM did not violate the offender’s Fourth Amendment 
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.105  Applying 
the same reasoning to digital medication, because the same results 
could be achieved through random urine testing, it would follow that the 
monitoring component of the digital pill would not violate an offender’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.106 
Indeed, if a special condition requiring compliance with digital 
medication were to survive the demanding strict scrutiny test that 
governs challenges brought on substantive due process grounds, it is an 
almost foregone conclusion that the condition would also survive a 
challenge under the Fourth Amendment.  In the Fourth Amendment 
context, the state merely needs to show that the search was 
“reasonable” after considering the individual’s right to privacy, on the 
one hand, and the government’s legitimate interests, on the other.107  
This highly deferential standard is rendered even more so in the context 
of a condition of parole or probation.  The Court has held that parolees 
do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”108  
A parolee’s expectation of privacy is even further diminished when he is 
clearly informed of the condition of parole that infringes on his privacy 
interest.109  Given this deferential standard, compounded with the wide 
latitude district courts are afforded when crafting special conditions of 
supervised release,110 it is not surprising that, while relatively common, 
Fourth Amendment challenges to terms of supervised release are by and 
large unsuccessful.111   
  
 
 104 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (a presumptive mandatory condition of supervised release is 
that the offender submit to at least three periodic drug tests). 
 105 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 106 Additional challenges focus on whether SCRAM evidence is sufficiently reliable to 
be admitted.  See, e.g., People v. Dorcent, 909 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. Oct. 22, 
2010).  Evidentiary standards are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 107 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). 
 108 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
 109 Id. 
 110 United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States 
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234 
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that district courts have “broad discretion” when imposing 
terms of supervised release, even when it comes to “restrictions that infringe on 
fundamental rights”). 
 111 See Naomi M. Weinstein, The Legal Aspects of Conditional Release in the Criminal 
and Civil Court System, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 666, 672 (2014). 
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Certain instruments of monitoring, such as the electronic location 
monitoring of sex offenders or registry statutes, are also commonly 
challenged112 under the Ex Post Facto Clause.113  The Ex Post Facto 
Clause bars application of a law “that changes the punishment, and 
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when 
committed.”114  To prevail on an ex post facto claim, a defendant must 
show (1) that the law operates retroactively, and (2) that the law works 
to increase the penalty from what it was at the time he committed the 
crime.115  More often than not, these challenges fail, as reviewing courts 
have repeatedly held that even the most draconian civil statutes116 are 
regulatory in nature—not punitive—and, therefore, not ex post facto 
laws.117  To determine whether a law is regulatory or punitive, courts 
first and foremost look to the intent of the legislature.118  If it is clear the 
intent was to impose punishment, “that ends the inquiry.”119  If the 
intention was to enact a “civil and nonpunitive” regulatory scheme,120 
the courts will apply the multifactor test elucidated in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez121 to ensure that the purpose or effect of the 
regulation is not so punitive as to overcome the deference extended to 
the legislature.122  Key to this analysis is an inquiry into the principal 
 
 112 See John Kip Cornwell, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Government Regulation 
of Public Health, Safety, and Morality, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 16 (2015); see also 
Murphy, supra note 93, at 1347. 
 113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 114 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
386, 390 (1798)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 This Comment does not address the use of digital medication outside the confines 
of the formal criminal process.  Accordingly, further exploration is needed regarding the 
potential uses of digital medication in the civil preventative outpatient commitment 
context.  See generally John Kip Cornwell & Raymond Deeney, Exposing the Myths 
Surrounding Preventative Outpatient Commitment for Individuals with Chronic Mental 
Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (2003). 
 117 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex 
Offender Registration Act was designed to be a civil, nonpunitive way of identifying past 
offenders for the purpose of protecting the public from the risk of recidivism); Belleau 
v. Wall, F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding a Wisconsin law that imposed a condition 
of lifetime electronic monitoring for sex offenders released from civil commitment to be 
prevention and not punishment). 
 118 Smith, 538 U.S. at 93. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 372 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1963) (factors include whether the sanction “has 
historically been regarded as a punishment;” whether its operation will further the 
traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence; “whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime;” and whether it appears to be excessive 
in nature). 
 122 Smith, 538 U.S. at 93. 
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aims of the condition of supervised release, as evidenced by the number 
of courts that have consistently held that conditions of supervised 
release should not be regarded as punishment if they “further the 
deterrent, protective and rehabilitative goals of sentencing.”123  
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks124 found that for 
a law to be punitive it must further punitive goals: either “affix 
culpability for prior criminal conduct” or deter future crime.125  While a 
special condition requiring digital medication compliance does 
potentially deter future crime, it also furthers nonpunitive goals, such as 
ensuring proper mental health treatment and the safety of the offender 
and the community at large.126  Given this precedent, it is probable that 
a condition imposing digital medication would be regarded as 
regulatory and, therefore, would not be an ex post facto law. 
Assuming arguendo that a special condition of supervised release 
requiring compliance with digital medication is punitive,127 such a 
condition is subject to scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause.  It is 
unlikely that such a claim will succeed, however.  First, the Court has 
held that the Clause “looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by 
a statute rather than to the sentence actually imposed.”128  While digital 
medication introduces another mode of ensuring compliance with 
antipsychotic medication, the standard that governs when a court could 
impose such a condition remains unchanged.  Additionally, courts have 
held that there is no ex post facto prohibition on laws that change only 
the procedures by which a case is adjudicated while leaving unchanged 
the “substantive law of crimes.”129  A change in the methodology by 
 
 123 United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. 
Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 
377, 382 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 776 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 124 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 125 Id. at 362. 
 126 See Winston, 850 F.3d at 381–82 for the proposition that a finding that a condition 
furthers goals of deterrence is not necessarily determinative that a law is punitive in 
nature. 
 127 Certain factors support a finding that such a special condition would be punitive, 
including: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the statute addressing terms of supervised release after 
imprisonment, is codified in Title 18, Crime and Criminal Procedure, evincing a 
legislative intent that the statute should be construed as penal in nature; and (2) courts 
and commentators have discussed supervised release as being an integral part of the 
penal sentencing scheme.  See United States v. Larson, 402 Fed. Appx. 349, 354 (2010); 
see also Byran R. Diederich, Risking Retroactive Punishment: Modifications of the 
Supervised Release Statute and the Ex Post Facto Prohibition, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1551, 1554 
(1999) (commenting that supervised release is an integral part of federal sentencing 
scheme). 
 128 Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937). 
 129 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990). 
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which courts oversee medication compliance can be analogized to a 
procedural alteration, rather than a substantive one.  As stated above, 
the “substance” of this additional form of punishment—if indeed, that is 
what it is—namely, the statutory and constitutional constructs that 
govern when a court can impose such a condition, remains unchanged.  
Therefore, even if a special condition mandating use of digital 
medication can be properly considered punitive, it does not offend the 
Ex Post Facto Clause. 
III.  A CONDITION OF RELEASE MANDATING USE OF DIGITAL MEDICATION 
REPRESENTS GOOD POLICY 
As the previous Part showed, a district court must first make a 
finding that an offender is a danger to himself or others before imposing 
a condition of involuntary medication, whether it be digital medication 
or otherwise.130  Thus, the requisite condition for any such term of 
supervised release reflects what is perhaps the primary benefit of 
compulsory medication—keeping people, both the offender and the 
public at large, safe.   
Separate and apart from ensuring the health and safety of the 
offender and those individuals he comes into contact with, digital 
medication could also be an important and effective tool to ameliorate 
some of the intense strain placed on both our criminal justice and 
mental health systems.  The hope is that digital medication will help 
ensure that offenders on supervised release remain stable, thereby 
reducing the very high rates of recidivism among the mentally ill 
offender population131 and hopefully preventing mental health crises 
that divert critical resources away from a severely underserved 
population.132   
 
 130 See supra Section II.A. 
 131 Matthew E. Hirschtritt & Renee L. Binder, Interrupting the Mental Illness-
Incarceration-Recidivism Cycle, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 695, 696 (Feb. 21, 2017) (noting 
that the rate of recidivism for mentally ill offenders is nearly twice the national average; 
53 percent for mentally ill offenders compared to 30 percent for offenders without a 
history of mental illness); see also JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 
2011–12, 7 (2017) (finding that prisoners with multiple arrests were more likely to have 
a history of a mental health problem than prisoners with one arrest and that almost half 
of those surveyed with a history of a mental health problem had been arrested 11 times 
or more). 
 132 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., EMPTYING THE ‘NEW ASYLUMS:’ A BEDS CAPACITY MODEL TO 
REDUCE MENTAL ILLNESS BEHIND BARS 5–6 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter EMPTYING THE NEW 
ASYLUMS], https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/emptying-
new-asylums.pdf. 
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A.  Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder 
Many Departments of Corrections, including the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP), classify a wide spectrum of mental disorders as “serious 
mental illnesses.”133  This Comment will focus on two specific diagnoses, 
both of which are treated with the digital pill—schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder.134 
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental illness characterized by 
“delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, and other 
symptoms that cause social or occupational dysfunction.”135  
Schizophrenia requires long-term treatment, which is usually 
comprised of both antipsychotics and therapy.136  Similarly, bipolar 
disorder is a chronic mental illness, typically treated with 
medications.137  Those who suffer from bipolar disorder, also referred 
to as manic-depressive illness, experience dramatic fluctuations in 
mood and energy levels.138  Symptoms of bipolar disorder include 
alternating periods of depression and “mania,” characterized by 
increased activity, racing thoughts, and impulsive behavior.139   
As noted supra, non-adherence to medication regimes is endemic 
to the treatment of both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.140  “Non-
 
 133 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS’ USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING FOR INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5 n.18 (2017) (BOP 
policy lists schizophrenia, bipolar and related disorders, and major depressive disorder 
as diagnoses generally classified as serious mental illnesses.  Other diagnoses such as 
anxiety disorders, autism spectrum disorders, and personality disorders, to name but a 
few, are additional diagnoses that can be classified as serious mental illness, particularly 
if the condition is “sufficiently severe, persistent, and disabling”). 
 134 Bipolar disorder is a category that encompasses three related diagnoses—bipolar 
I, bipolar II, and cyclothymic disorder.  What Is Bipolar Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 
[hereinafter What is Bipolar Disorder?], https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/
bipolar-disorders/what-are-bipolar-disorders (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).  The digital pill 
is only indicated to treat bipolar I disorder, however, many of the statistics regarding 
offenders with serious mental illness lump these diagnoses together referring to them, 
collectively, as “bipolar disorder(s).”  Therefore, it should be noted that only a segment 
of this offender population could potentially be treated by the digital pill.  See Product 
Information, supra note 9. 
 135 DSM-5 Fact Sheet: Schizophrenia, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.
org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2019). 
 136 Xiang Cong Tham et al., Factors Affecting Medication Adherence Among Adults With 
Schizophrenia: A Literature Review, 30 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 797, 797 (2016). 
 137 What Is Bipolar Disorder?, supra note 134. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Press Release, FDA, supra note 1. 
 140 Brown & Gray, supra note 12, at 192; see also Colom et al., supra note 12, at 24. 
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adherence is the most powerful predictor of relapse,”141 which can have 
profound ramifications, not only for the individual patient but for the 
health care system as a whole.  It is estimated that non-adherence to 
medication costs approximately $100 billion per year, attributable to 
the increased cost of treatment and hospitalization.142  Use of the digital 
pill allows for transparency and accountability to help ensure that the 
patient is regularly taking his medication.  This is not only imperative to 
treating the patient’s mental illness but is also beneficial to our strained 
mental health care system. 
B.  Prisons and Jails as the “New Asylums” 143 
The mid-twentieth century saw a movement toward the 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill.144  Advancements in 
psychotropic medications and psychotherapy shepherded in a dramatic 
shift away from “warehousing” the mentally ill in hospitals and 
institutions to treating them in comprehensive community mental 
health centers.145  With the passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities 
and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, 
community-based care became the standard of mental health 
treatment.146  The Act provided for the construction of 2,000 community 
health centers by 1980 and anticipated a growth rate of one center for 
every increase of 100,000 to the population.147  As of 2017, there were 
approximately 2,500 such community mental health centers.148   
While the construction of community centers has not kept pace 
with the growing need, the number of state hospital beds for the 
mentally ill has sharply declined over the past sixty years.149  The dire 
 
 141 Brown & Gray, supra note 12, at 193; see also Tham et al., supra note 136, at 797 
(citing the main reason for relapse in schizophrenics to be non-adherence to 
antipsychotics). 
 142 See Belluck, supra note 14.  
 143 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132. 
 144 See, e.g., Deinstitutionalization, Mental Illness, and Medications: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance). 
 145 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/
about/national-mental-health-association/overview/community-mental-health-act 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
 146 Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963). 
 147 Hearing, supra note 144, at 2 (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance). 
 148 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMIN., NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES STUDY (N-MHSS): DATA ON MENTAL HEALTH 
TREATMENT FACILITIES 36 (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
cbhsq-reports/2017_National_Mental_Health_Services_Survey.pdf. 
 149 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 5. 
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lack of space and resources means that “[i]n 44 states and the District of 
Columbia, a prison or jail holds more individuals with serious mental 
illness than the largest remaining state psychiatric hospital.”150  This 
translates to almost 400,000 men and women, suffering from a mental 
health condition, being held in U.S. jails and prisons.151  Put in the 
context of the entire prison and jail population, approximately 37 
percent of state and federal prisoners and 44 percent of jail inmates, 
respectively, reported a history of a mental health problem.152  Of those 
respective populations, 18 percent of prisoners and 25 percent of jail 
inmates reported a history of bipolar disorder, and 9 percent of 
prisoners and 12 percent of jail inmates reported a history of 
schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder.153  When compared to the 
paltry percentages of the U.S. general population who have received 
these diagnoses—2.8 percent for bipolar disorder and 0.25-0.64 
percent for schizophrenia154—it is evident that persons suffering from 
these serious mental health diagnoses are severely overrepresented in 
our nation’s jails and prisons.  The staggering rate of incarceration in the 
mentally ill community is exacerbated by the very high rates of 
recidivism that characterize this population.155  The digital pill can help 
stem the tide of recidivism, and thereby reduce rates of incarceration, 
by providing a mechanism to help ensure that mentally ill offenders 
remain stable on their medication. 
C.  Improving Mental Health Outcomes for Mentally Ill Offenders 
Will Help Close the Revolving Door of Prisons  
The mentally ill are particularly susceptible to the physical, 
emotional, and psychological stresses of incarceration, which lead them 
to further decompensate.156  The stresses of institutional life can 
manifest in myriad ways, including violence.  A 2017 special report from 
 
 150 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., GOING, GOING, GONE: TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
ELIMINATING STATE PSYCHIATRIC BEDS 9 (June 2016), https://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/storage/documents/going-going-gone.pdf. 
 151 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 1. 
 152 BRONSON & BERZOFSKY, supra note 131, at 1. 
 153 Id. at 3. 
 154 Mental Health Information: Statistics (Schizophrenia), NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/schizophrenia.shtml#part_1548
80 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Mental Health Information: Statistics (Bipolar Disorder), 
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/bipolar-
disorder.shtml#part_155460 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 155 See Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 696. 
 156 See Fellner, supra note 19, at 391 (2006); see also Jailing People with Mental Illness, 
NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/learn-more/public-policy/jailing-
people-with-mental-illness (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
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the U.S. Department of Justice stated that prisoners and jail inmates with 
a history of severe mental illness were more likely to have been charged 
with assault compared to prisoners and inmates with no such history.157  
A strong argument could be made that at least some of this violence is 
preemptive, as the mentally ill all too often find themselves the targets 
of both sexual and physical violence.158  Sadly, but perhaps not 
surprising given these realities of life behind bars, prisoners with 
mental illness are more likely to attempt or complete suicide, which is 
the leading cause of death in U.S. jails.159   
Additionally, the disorganized thought processes and poor impulse 
control that characterize schizophrenia and bipolar disorder also make 
it difficult for mentally ill prisoners to conform their behavior to the 
strict requirements of institutionalized life.160  Consequently, mentally 
ill prisoners are more likely to receive disciplinary infractions while in 
prison.161  And it is not just the symptoms of mental illness that make 
incarceration particularly hard on these prisoners, but also the rigid and 
punitive characteristics of incarceration itself, which are inherently at 
odds with the mental health needs of this population.162 
Perhaps most troubling, all of these factors that characterize a 
mentally ill offender’s experience in prison—the increased likelihood of 
victimization, the difficulty in adhering to the rigidity of incarceration, 
and concerns that the offender may be a risk to himself or others—are 
also all reasons why offenders find themselves in solitary 
confinement.163  Solitary confinement is shown to have devasting 
 
 157 BRONSON & BERZOFSKY, supra note 131, at 9. 
 158 Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D. Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health 
Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: Who is Doing What? 35 LAW HUM. 
BEHAV. 351, 352 (2011). 
 159 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 1. 
 160 Kenneth Adams & Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prison, 35 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 913, 917 (2008). 
 161 Bewley & Morgan, supra note 158, at 352. 
 162 Fellner, supra note 19, at 391 (noting that it is “nearly impossible” to coordinate 
the needs of the mentally ill with rules and goals reflecting “staff concerns about 
security, safety, power, and control”); see also Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 160, 
at 914 (quoting a report from the Oregon Department of Corrections acknowledging 
that “finding safe, humane, and non-punitive methods for handling inmates who are 
experiencing the symptoms of mental illness is an ongoing challenge for prison 
administrators”). 
 163 See Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human 
Rights of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 712 (2012) (statement of Michael 
Jacobson, President & Director, Vera Institute of Justice) (noting that solitary 
confinement is most commonly used in the United States: (1) “to punish prisoners for 
rule violations;” (2) to isolate those prisoners believed to be a risk to the safety of others 
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consequences for a person’s mental health.164  BOP’s policy “recognizes 
that an inmate’s mental health may deteriorate during restrictive 
housing placement.”165  Symptoms such as social anxiety, depression, a 
decline in cognitive abilities, and instances of self-harm and suicide, 
have been exhibited by even those prisoners who entered solitary 
without a diagnosis of mental illness.166 
The psychological harm endemic to solitary confinement is why, in 
2011, the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council issued 
an interim report stating that imposition of solitary confinement on 
persons with mental disabilities constitutes “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment,” which violates the Convention against Torture.167  
Despite those recommendations, a 2017 investigation of federal 
prisoners conducted by the Office of the Inspector General found that 
even though the BOP’s official policy denounces solitary confinement, 
prisoners, including those with mental illness, were housed in single 
cells for extended periods with very little human contact.168  And the 
problem of the mentally ill being held in solitary confinement is not 
unique to the federal penal system; similar observations have been 
noted in state systems as well.169  
The mental decompensation that is an almost inevitable byproduct 
of solitary confinement is deeply disconcerting, not only for the health 
of the individuals who must endure such conditions but for the safety 
and security of the community at large.  Particularly problematic are 
reports that inmates with mental illness are released directly from 
solitary confinement into the community, some of whom have spent 
 
or to the security of the institution; and (3) to protect those thought to be at risk from 
other members of the general population). 
 164 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 1. 
 165 Id. (citing BOP Program Statement 5310.16, Treatment and Care of Inmates with 
Mental Illness (May 1, 2014)).  Restrictive housing, often a euphemism for solitary 
confinement, consists of the placement in a locked room or cell for twenty-two hours or 
more a day; however, under the U.S. Department of Justice’s definition of restrictive 
housing, it could include being housed under such conditions with another inmate.  Id. 
 166 Sarah Childress, Craig Haney: Solitary Confinement is a “Tried-and-True” Torture 
Device, FRONTLINE, PBS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
craig-haney-solitary-confinement-is-a-tried-and-true-torture-device.  
 167 Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of 
the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 21, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011), http://solitary
confinement.org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf. 
 168 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at i. 
 169 See Childress, supra note 166 (commenting on being “taken aback” by the number 
of seemingly mental ill offenders housed in solitary confinement in Pelican Bay State 
Prison in California during the early 1990s). 
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years in isolation.170  Both experts and prison officials maintain that 
failing to re-socialize inmates before release into the community is 
troubling,171 and can have disastrous consequences.172 
All of these are reasons why the criminal justice system should 
utilize innovative tools, such as the digital pill, to ensure that mentally 
ill offenders are receiving proper treatment once released and help stem 
the likelihood of recidivism.173 
D.  Reducing Recidivism Improves Prison Conditions for All174 
There are approximately 2.2 million people incarcerated in our 
nation’s jails and prisons, which equates to a 500 percent increase over 
the last forty years.175  Concurrent with this increase in the overall 
population, the number of people with serious mental illness entering 
the criminal justice system has also increased exponentially.176 
Some jurisdictions have tried to mitigate this disturbing trend by 
instituting mental health courts to provide more specialized attention 
to this vulnerable population.177  While the number of mental health 
courts has been slowly increasing over the past twenty years, and 
 
 170 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 27. 
 171 Id.; see also Childress, supra note 166. 
 172 See Rick Raemisch, Why We Ended Long-Term Solitary Confinement in Colorado, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/opinion/solitary-
confinement-colorado-prison.html (remembering Tom Clements, the former executive 
director of the Colorado Department of Corrections who, in 2013, was assassinated by a 
former prisoner who had been released directly into the community after spending 
seven years in solitary confinement). 
 173 This Comment does not suggest that digital medication should curtail the 
important work being done to restrict the use of solitary confinement.  Rather, it 
recognizes that while this uphill battle ensues, the criminal justice system should 
explore all alternatives to reduce the numbers of mentally ill people in our prisons and 
jails and, in turn, solitary confinement. 
 174 The author would like to reiterate that nothing in this Comment proposes that 
digital medication is a quick fix for the myriad shortcomings of our criminal justice and 
mental health systems.  There is no question that comprehensive reform is needed to 
reduce our staggering prison population, particularly with regard to diverting 
vulnerable populations, like those suffering from mental illness and substance abuse 
disorders, away from the criminal justice system and into programs that provide them 
with holistic care.  This Comment merely suggests that the digital pill may help a small 
segment of offenders who may benefit from closer supervision while adjusting to life in 
an non-institutional setting. 
 175 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, https://www.
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf 
(last updated Oct. 2020). 
 176 See Fellner, supra note 19, at 392–94. 
 177 Desmond Loong et al., The Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts in Reducing 
Recidivism and Police Contact: A Systematic Review, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. (June 
2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10597-019-00421-9. 
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although recent data suggests that these courts help reduce rates of 
recidivism and improve offender outcomes,178 state and federal 
correctional systems remain overwhelmed with staggering numbers of 
mentally ill inmates.179  While mentally ill prisoners are omnipresent 
throughout both state and federal correctional institutions, a recent 
study suggests that only twenty percent of mentally ill offenders 
reported receiving any mental health treatment while incarcerated.180 
In 2014, BOP attempted to address the failings of the federal 
system to provide mental health treatment, issuing a new policy that 
provided for more comprehensive care and treatment for mentally ill 
offenders.181  This well-intentioned and much-needed policy, however, 
may have had a perverse effect.  A 2017 report from the Office of the 
Inspector General found that BOP had not provided sufficient resources 
to implement their new policy and, consequently, mental health staff at 
federal prisons may have deliberately reduced the number of prisoners 
classified as seriously mentally ill to alleviate some of this additional 
workload.182  The report went on to find that, even when prisoners were 
properly classified, mental health staff shortages resulted in some 
inmates with mental illness not receiving adequate care.183   
Not only is this extremely troubling for the individual patients who 
are not getting the care they need, but this failure to provide proper 
treatment could have ramifications for the prison system as a whole.  In 
the seminal case, Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that “deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes . . . 
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” prohibited by the Eighth 
 
 178 Id.  
 179 See Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 160, at 913; see also Fellner, supra note 19, 
at 394. 
 180 Jane C. Daquin & Leah E. Daigle, Mental Disorder and Victimisation in Prison: 
Examining the Role of Mental Health Treatment, 28 CRIM. BEHAV. AND MENTAL HEALTH 141, 
149 (2018). 
 181 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 37. 
 182 Id. (finding that while the number of inmates requiring some level of mental 
health care remained relatively stagnant over the course of four years, the number of 
inmates classified as needing such care decreased approximately thirty percent in the 
year after the new policy was issued). 
 183 Id. at 37, 41 (quoting interview with BOP Chief Psychologist where he admitted 
that mental health staff shortages resulted in people “reducing care levels in order to 
survive”); see also Christie Thompson & Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Treatment Denied: 
The Mental Health Crisis in Federal Prisons, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/21/treatment-denied-the-mental-
health-crisis-in-federal-prisons (statement from BOP psychologist that psychologists 
were often required to man gun towers or perform prisoner escorts, lamenting, “[w]e’re 
not really devoted to treating”). 
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Amendment.184  Subsequent circuit court decisions have held that when 
analyzing whether the level of care meets constitutional standards, 
there is to be no distinction drawn between physical and mental health 
care.185  Additionally, federal courts have held that maintaining mental 
health staff in “sufficient numbers to identify and treat in an 
individualized manner those treatable inmates suffering from serious 
mental disorders” is essential to constitutionally adequate mental 
health care.186   
In Coleman v. Wilson, the Eastern District of California found that 
the California Department of Corrections’ “significant” and “chronic” 
understaffing of its mental health care services violated the Eighth 
Amendment.187  This chronic understaffing was only one of the myriad 
constitutional violations that led to the appointment of a Special Master 
to oversee the implementation of remedial measures designed to cure 
these violations.188  “In 2007, 12 years after his appointment, the Special 
Master in Coleman” issued a report detailing the “deteriorating” state of 
mental health care in California’s prison system, ascribing this decline 
to the severe overcrowding in the prison system.189  Confronted with a 
similar scathing report from the Receiver in Plata v. Brown, a related 
case concerning the condition of medical care in California prisons, the 
Coleman and Plata plaintiffs moved their respective district courts to 
convene a three-judge panel to order the California Department of 
Corrections to reduce the state’s prison population.190  The three-judge 
panel, under power of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, ordered 
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity, 
a reduction which equated to approximately 38,000 to 46,000 prisoners 
within two years.191  On appeal, the Court, while recognizing that the 
potential release of such a large number of prisoners “is a matter of 
undoubted, grave concern,”192 upheld the panel’s order, finding that the 
“mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls below the 
 
 184 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
173 (1976)). 
 185 See Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); Torraco v. Maloney, 
923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 
(4th Cir. 1977). 
 186 Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1577 (D. Idaho 1984) (citing 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980)). 
 187 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1307–08 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
 188 Id. at 1324. 
 189 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 507 (2011). 
 190 Id. at 509. 
 191 Id. at 509–10. 
 192 Id. at 501. 
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standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.  This 
extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a 
remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.”193 
As the Court’s order in Plata makes clear, constitutional levels of 
care are irreconcilable with overcrowded correctional institutions.194  
Thus, reducing rates of recidivism, particularly among offenders with 
serious mental illness who require additional care and services, helps 
ensure that all prisoners and jail inmates receive a constitutional level 
of care. 
E.  Ensuring Medication Adherence Helps Alleviate the Strain Placed 
on Mental Health System 
In many states, detainees deemed incompetent to stand trial can 
remain hospitalized “even though they are not ill enough to qualify for 
involuntary hospitalization under civil commitment laws.”195  Given the 
grossly inadequate number of mental health beds in state hospitals, this 
often leaves more critically ill members of the community out on the 
streets.196 
Digital medication addresses this problem by identifying non-
adherence early, before an offender can decompensate to the point 
where he may need to be hospitalized to restore competency.197  Take, 
for example, the offender in Holman.198  When he was first released from 
prison, the conditions of his supervised release contained no 
requirement that he receive mental health treatment or take all 
prescribed medications.199  It was only upon recommendation of his 
probation officer that the conditions were modified to contain such 
requirements; however, by then, it was too late.200  Holman had left his 
home, leaving his medication behind.201  He was found several weeks 
later, “wandering aimlessly and in a partially catatonic state.”202  It took 
 
 193 Id. at 545. 
 194 Id. at 502 (stating that “overcrowding is the ‘primary cause’ . . . [of] the severe and 
unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical 
and mental health care”). 
 195 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 17. 
 196 See id. 
 197 See Larsen-Barr et al., supra note 73, at 372 (studies evidence that withdrawal 
from antipsychotic medications can be severe enough to require hospitalization). 
 198 532 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 199 Holman, 532 F.3d at 286.  
 200 Id.  
 201 Id. 
 202 Id.  
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several months before he was stabilized and deemed competent to 
stand trial for violating the terms of his supervised release.203   
While the opinion in Holman is silent as to where he was held while 
his competency was restored, it is reasonable to assume that it was in a 
hospital.  Thus, if digital medication had identified his non-adherence 
earlier, before he decompensated to the point of hospitalization, a 
member of the community could have used this mental health bed.  This 
is especially poignant when one considers the unknown number of 
patients who are turned away from hospital care, unable to get the 
medical treatment they so desperately need, who then go on to commit 
crime, “typically misdemeanors and nuisance offenses,”204 thus 
perpetuating the cycle of incarceration, decompensation, and 
recidivism. 
F.  Potential Counterarguments 
Opponents of digital medication might argue that such technology 
could actually increase rates of recidivism by imposing yet another 
condition that offenders would have to comply with upon penalty of 
revocation of their term of supervised release.205  There is some 
evidence that suggests mentally ill offenders are returned to prison 
more often for technical violations of parole than for committing a new 
crime.206  Moreover, the nature of mental illness, particularly 
schizophrenia, can make compliance with conditions of supervised 
release more difficult.207  The concern is that a condition mandating 
digital medication would be setting mentally ill offenders up for failure 
and effectively criminalizing their mental illness.   
Compounding this concern of an overly rigid condition that does 
not account for the compliance challenges inherent to mental illness is 
the reality that the technology itself is not perfect.  It is possible that a 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 6. 
 205 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“[T]he court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, 
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release 
. . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated 
a condition of supervised release. . . .”). 
 206 Jennifer Eno Louden et al., How Do Probation Officers Assess and Manage 
Recidivism and Violence Risk for Probationers With Mental Disorder?  An Experimental 
Investigation, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 22, 22–23 (2013). 
 207 Tham et al., supra note 136, at 807 (noting that “[p]sychotic symptoms have been 
linked to declining memory and executive function[,] . . . [t]herefore, those with severe 
symptoms cannot make appropriate decisions to take medications, leading to 
medication non-adherence”). 
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taken dose might not be reflected in the transmitted data.208  For these 
reasons, it is apparent that this condition cannot be absolute.  One 
missed pill cannot be a reason to revoke an offender’s supervised 
release.209  Several missed pills in a week would be a red flag to have an 
intervention with the probation officer and a mental health professional 
to prevent further non-adherence.  Only after a subsequent pattern of 
missed dosages after such a meeting would a probation officer be 
warranted in revoking the offender’s supervised release.  Just because 
the realities of the illness and the technology demand flexibility does not 
suggest that digital medication is without value.  Research indicates that 
parole supervision decreases the likelihood that mentally ill offenders 
will recidivate.210  Moreover, there is evidence that adherence behavior 
engenders a healthy and proactive attitude toward preventing relapse 
and “enjoy[ing] the advantages of being adherent,” which in turn fosters 
adherence in the future.211  Thus, a condition imposing digital 
medication could reduce recidivism through increased supervision and 
improved medication adherence, even after the term of supervised 
release expires. 
Another argument against the imposition of digital medication is 
that medication alone will not keep the seriously mentally ill from 
recidivating because the question of why the mentally ill recidivate at 
rates that far exceed their non-mentally ill counterparts212 is far more 
nuanced.  Studies suggest that a confluence of factors contribute to high 
rates of recidivism, including high rates of substance abuse, 213 
 
 208 Product Information, ABILIFY MYCITE, https://www.abilifymycite.com/about (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2020). 
 209 Given the limitations of the technology, not only would such a stringent condition 
be inherently unfair, it would also be unlikely to meet due process protections that 
attach to supervised release revocation.  See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980); see 
also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (noting that both the parolee and 
society have “an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous 
information”).  
 210 Jason Matejkowski & Michael Ostermann, Serious Mental Illness, Criminal Risk, 
Parole Supervision, and Recidivism: Testing of Conditional Effects, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
75, 77 (2015). 
 211 Tham et al., supra note 136, at 807. 
 212 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-182, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, 
FEDERAL PRISONS: INFORMATION ON INMATES WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS AND STRATEGIES TO 
REDUCE RECIDIVISM, 2 (2018). 
 213 Samantha Hoke, Mental Illness and Prisoners: Concerns for Communities and 
Healthcare Providers, 20 ONLINE J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING (Jan. 2015), http://ojin.nursing
world.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofCont
ents/Vol-20-2015/No1-Jan-2015/Mental-Illness-and-Prisoners.html; see also KiDeuk 
Kim et al., The Processing and Treatment of Mentally Ill Persons in the Criminal Justice 
System (Mar. 2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/48981/
2000173-The-Processing-and-Treatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-Criminal-
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unemployment,214 homelessness,215 and a lack of access to mental health 
services.216   
The federal and various state governments have enacted 
legislation aimed at reducing rates of recidivism by targeting these 
sociological and criminogenic risks.217  Other federal and state programs 
are aimed at providing mentally ill offenders with employment 
opportunities, educational opportunities, and substance abuse 
treatment—all of which have proved to be successful in reducing 
recidivism rates.218   
A term of supervised release that mandates digital medication 
should not be viewed as supplanting these programs but rather as an 
integral complement to them.  Stabilizing a patient on medication is an 
important precursor to psychotherapy, vocational training, or 
substance abuse treatment.219  In particular, there is a high correlation 
between mental illness and substance abuse.220  Moreover, research 
shows that offenders with both mental illness and a history of substance 
abuse are more likely to recidivate than those with serious mental 
illness alone.221  Evidence suggests that the high rates of substance 
abuse among the mentally ill can be attributed to a desire to treat, or at 
least lessen, the symptoms of mental illness.222  Thus it follows that 
 
Justice-System.pdf (stating that nearly three-quarters of state prisoners with a history 
of mental health problems reported a co-occurring substance dependence). 
 214 See Hoke, supra note 213. 
 215 Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 695 (lifetime arrest rates of homeless 
individuals with serious mental illness at a staggering rate of 62.9 to 90 percent). 
 216 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 15. 
 217 See Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 696 (discussing bills passed in 
Montana, Nevada, and Virginia in 2013 which provide funding to support community-
based organizations that provide substance abuse services, employment and housing 
resources, and medical care to ex-offenders with serious mental illness); see also 21st 
Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, § 14022(l)(2)(c)(i) (Dec. 13, 
2016) (permitting the Attorney General to award grant monies to applicants for the 
development of “post-release transition plans for eligible inmates that, in a 
comprehensive manner, coordinate health, housing, medical, employment, and other 
appropriate services and public benefits”). 
 218 Hoke, supra note 213. 
 219 Glenn D. Walters & Gregory Crawford, Major Mental Illness and Violence History as 
Predictors of Institutional Misconduct and Recidivism: Main and Interaction Effects, 38 
LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 238, 245 (2013) (Psychotropic “[m]edication should . . . be 
supplemented by a multidimensional approach designed to address the manifold mental 
health- and criminal justice-related problems experienced by [seriously mentally ill] 
offenders”). 
 220 James A. Wilson & Peter B. Wood, Dissecting the Relationship Between Mental 
Illness and Return to Incarceration, 42 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 527, 528 (2014). 
 221 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 212, at 2. 
 222 Hoke, supra note 213. 
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focusing on medication adherence would abate one of the key drivers of 
substance abuse and, therefore, recidivism, which is the desire to obtain 
relief from one’s symptoms through self-medication. 
Another potential counterargument is the cost of digital 
medication, which opponents would suggest is prohibitive.223  In 
addition to the cost of the drug itself, users will also need access to a 
Bluetooth-enabled device for the monitoring system to function.224  
While there is no question that the digital pill is a more expensive 
alternative, certainly more than generic antipsychotics, there are 
several reasons why this factor alone does not defeat an argument that 
digital medication should be considered a useful tool for the right 
patient.  First, courts would only mandate digital medication for those 
patients for whom a traditional oral antipsychotic would not be a viable 
alternative because of a history of non-adherence.225  Thus, the 
appropriate comparison would be between digital medication and 
LAIAs.  When comparing these alternatives, the price differential is less 
stark.226  And after factoring in the additional administrative costs, this 
price differential becomes even more negligible.227  It should also be 
noted that digital medication is in its infancy.228  Venture capitalists have 
been pouring a tremendous amount of money into new digital 
technologies,229 suggesting that competitive products are likely to enter 
the market and drive the price down.230  
Additionally, there is some question as to which party would 
shoulder this cost—the criminal justice system or the individual 
offender.  Most likely it would be the individual, who will then be left to 
 
 223 Zoë LaRock, Smart Pills Aren’t Living up to the Hype Yet—But They’re Not Doomed, 
BUS INSIDER, https://www.businessinsider.com/abilify-mycite-smart-pill-lacks-
evidence-of-benefits-2019-7 (July 23, 2019) (digital medication is currently priced at 
$1,650, while the generic alternative costs $20).  
 224 Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4. 
 225 See supra Section II.B. 
 226 See CAN. AGENCY FOR DRUGS AND TECH. IN HEALTH, ARIPIPRAZOLE PROLONGED RELEASE 
SUSPENSION FOR INJECTION, (Abilify Maintena) (300 mg and 400 mg Vial) tbl.1, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Feb. 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK447758/
table/pe1.t1/ (manufacturer’s submitted price of vial of long-acting atypical 
antipsychotic ranges from $78 to $635). 
 227 See Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 694 (patients often cite loss of time spent 
on travel to the clinic for monthly injections and high direct and indirect costs as 
significant drawbacks to LAIAs). 
 228 See Press Release, FDA, supra note 1. 
 229 Belluck, supra note 14.  
 230 Despite Proteus’s June 2020 bankruptcy filing, analysts remain enthusiastic about 
the future of this technology.  See THE MED. FUTURIST, The Present and Future of Digital 
Pills (July 21, 2020), https://medicalfuturist.com/the-present-and-future-of-digital-
pills. 
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navigate the murky waters of how his private health insurance or 
Medicaid process requests for court-ordered treatment.231  For this 
reason, it is essential that, prior to release, prison officials aid the 
offender in enrolling for Medicaid benefits, a service that many 
correctional systems have already recognized the value of.232  It should 
also be noted that if a patient is successful in getting Medicaid coverage 
for the digital pill, he may also qualify for a loan of a limited-functionality 
smartphone, necessary to receive and transmit the adherence data.233   
Alternatively, digital medication could be analogized to electronic 
monitoring services, which many states assume the cost of when it 
comes to indigent defendants.234  When considering the question of cost 
from the perspective of a state-payer system, one must compare the cost 
of digital medication to the cost of incarcerating seriously mentally ill 
offenders.  Studies suggest that state prisons spend upwards of $5 
billion annually to incarcerate non-violent mentally ill offenders.235  
Specifically, research indicates “[t]he economic impact of recidivism and 
psychiatric relapse among patients with schizophrenia is substantial 
from a state government perspective.”236  Viewed in light of the 
alternatives, the cost of digital medication becomes more palatable. 
Finally, it should be noted that the high cost associated with digital 
medication could actually be a good thing.  A primary critique of 
monitoring technologies is that the “economics of technological control 
 
 231 See MARSHA REGENSTEIN & LEA NOLAN, GEO. WASH. UNIV. DEP’T HEALTH POLICY,  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S MEDICAID EXPANSION ON LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS 
ON PROBATION (Feb. 2014), https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1296&context=sphhs_policy_facpubs (The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services has deferred from issuing a ruling as to whether state Medicaid programs must 
cover court-ordered treatments.  Absent guidance from the federal government, states 
are free to either include them among covered benefits or exclude them wholly from 
coverage.). 
 232 See Kim et al., supra note 213, at 34 (research indicates that enrolling seriously 
mentally ill offenders in Medicaid at the time of release from jail has proven to be an 
effective policy and one that has become common practice across a number of 
jurisdictions). 
 233 See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Advisory 
Opinion No. 19-02 (Jan. 29, 2019). 
 234 Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex Offenders: 
Legislative Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 414, 427 (2009). 
 235 Wilson & Wood, supra note 220, at 528. 
 236 I. Lin et al., General Model for Estimating Medical and Criminal Justice Costs Among 
Patients with Schizophrenia After Release From Jail/Prison, 17 VALUE IN HEALTH A218 
(2014), https://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(14)01326-6/pdf 
(estimating that a 20 percent increase in the proportion of ex-offenders treated with 
antipsychotics following release decreased total cumulative costs to the state of Florida 
by almost $600 per patient over three years). 
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enable the regulation of greater numbers of persons under less 
stringent conditions for a longer period of time and to a greater degree 
than an equivalent physical intrusion.”237  Therefore, the higher costs 
associated with digital medication serve as added insurance that this 
condition will be reserved only for those offenders for which there are 
not less intrusive, and less expensive, alternatives.   
IV.  POTENTIAL EXPANSION OF DIGITAL MEDICATION 
There are two primary areas where this technology could have 
useful implications and, therefore, should be explored further.  The first 
is in the realm of probation.  Similar to terms of supervised release, a 
district court may attach discretionary conditions to a sentence of 
probation.238  As in the context of conditions of supervised release, the 
court is authorized to impose a condition that an offender undergoes 
“available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment.”239  This 
determination must further the same statutory factors that govern 
conditional terms of supervised release.240  Additionally, such 
conditions must “involve only such deprivations of liberty or property 
as are reasonably necessary” to further such ends.241  Therefore, a court 
would analyze a condition of digital medication using many of the same 
factors in the probation context as it would in the context of supervised 
release. 
There are key distinctions, however.  First, if a court attaches the 
condition to the sentence without the consent of the offender, the 
prosecution may have difficulty proving the requisite history of non-
adherence to overcome an argument that a less intrusive alternative, 
namely a condition requiring the offender to take an oral antipsychotic 
as prescribed, is unlikely to achieve the same result.242  Alternatively, if 
the defendant voluntarily consents to the condition as part of a plea 
agreement, there will be a question of whether the defendant’s consent 
is valid or was coerced.243  Voluntariness is predicated upon the “plea of 
guilty [being] entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences . . . 
 
 237 Murphy, supra note 93, at 1367–68. 
 238 See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). 
 239 Id. § 3563(b)(9). 
 240 Id. § 3563(b); § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (“the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
the history and characteristics of the defendant” and considerations of punishment, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant”). 
 241 Id. § 3563(b). 
 242 See supra Section II.B. 
 243 Richard J. Bonnie, Judicially Mandated Treatment with Naltrexone for Opiate-
Addicted Criminal Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 64, 81 (2005). 
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of any commitments made to him by the court.”244  Therefore, depending 
on the defendant’s mental health at the time of prosecution, it may not 
be possible for him to voluntarily consent to such a condition.  If such 
voluntariness can be established, such a condition would greatly further 
the goals of preventing further mental decompensation while 
incarcerated and alleviating the strain placed on the criminal justice 
system through overcrowding.245 
The second area where the criminal justice system could 
potentially leverage this technology is the treatment of those struggling 
with opioid addiction.  An ingestible sensor could be embedded in a 
naltrexone tablet.  Naltrexone blocks specific receptors for opiate drugs, 
thereby preventing these narcotics from producing a high in users.246  
The potential advantages of such a drug are self-evident; whether a 
district court could impose such a condition of either supervised release 
or probation is less clear.  It is unlikely that the prosecution could make 
a sufficient showing of medical necessity, especially when there are 
much less intrusive alternatives, such as substance abuse treatment 
programs.  But, applying the Harper-Riggins-Sell framework, it is not 
inconceivable that—presented with a defendant who had repeatedly 
failed to comply with treatment programs and who had previously 
overdosed or had a history of committing violent acts while under the 
influence of opioids—a district court may mandate involuntary 
medication of digital naltrexone. 
In the probation context, when such a condition is being attached 
to a plea agreement, it is more likely that a condition mandating digital 
naltrexone would be upheld.  As long as the defendant was fully aware 
of the consequence of his commitment and his promise was not induced 
by “threats,” “misrepresentation,” or by “promises that are by their 
nature improper,” the district court is likely to find such a condition 
voluntary and, therefore, enforceable.247 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The mid-twentieth century witnessed a profound shift in the way 
mental illness was viewed and treated in the United States.  With the 
most benevolent of intentions, this movement away from 
institutionalization had an insidious effect—the mass incarceration of 
 
 244 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en 
banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
 245 See supra Sections III.A–B. 
 246 See Bonnie, supra note 243, at 67. 
 247 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n.2). 
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those with serious mental illness.  A swelling population of prisoners 
with serious mental health needs not only jeopardizes the physical and 
mental health of the offenders at issue but also compromises the ability 
of the criminal justice system to deliver a constitutional level of care to 
all offenders.  Reducing rates of recidivism among mentally ill offenders 
is an important step in alleviating the pressures placed on our criminal 
justice system, and digital medication, in conjunction with other terms 
of supervised release aimed at addressing the myriad sociological and 
criminological factors that contribute to recidivism, may well be a useful 
tool to achieve this end.   
 
